Standard approaches to the morality of abortion typically founder on the question of the “personhood” of the fetus. This paper attempts to avoid this problem by developing an alternative approach in which philosophical positions are derived not from a presumed right to life but from the special moral obligations of parents to nurture their immature children. After a discussion of the notion of parental responsibility, three leading accounts of the acquisition of parental responsibilities are examined: one based on biological relationship, (...) one based on consent, and one based on causal responsibility. The consequences of each of these positions for the morality of abortion are examined and each is considered in relation to cases involving nonstandard methods of procreation, e.g. surrogate mothering, artificial insemination by donor, and embryo transfer. On the basis of these cases, I argue that the model based on causal responsibility provides the most adequate criterion for the ascription of parental responsibility. While some discussion is devoted to the question of implementing this model as social policy, the main thrust of the paper is not so much to defend a particular policy on the morality of abortion as it is to argue for the approach to the problem based on the notion of parental responsibility over the more familiar approach relying on the right to life. (shrink)

The trend of much of recent moral philosophy has been to question the adequacy of traditional deontological and utilitarian views which place universal moral rights and duties at the center of ethical theory. Robert Goodin's book continues this trend and attempts to break new ground in ethical theory by proposing a general theory of special moral responsibilities. He argues that such responsibilities, though diverse in many ways, all derive from a common underlying moral principle, the vulnerability principle, according to which (...) moral agents acquire special responsibilities to the extent to which others are dependent upon them or are specially vulnerable in some way or ways to their choices and actions. (shrink)

This is a reply to Luckiesh's comments (see 18: 608) on Tinker's\nreview of Luckiesh and Moss' book, _Reading as a visual task_\n(see 17: 962). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all\nrights reserved).

Through case studies that highlight the type of information that is seldom reported in the news, Faces of Environmental Racism exposes the type and magnitude of environmental racism, both domestic and international. The essays explore the justice of current environmental practices, asking such questions as whether cost-benefit analysis is an appropriate analytic technique and whether there are alternate routes to sustainable development in the South.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NEWMAN'S PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCOVERY: THE ILLATIVE SENSE (V. Continued) 15. The Universals. A long and vehement dispute once raged about the reality of universals. Are they only mental creations, forged by the human brain, without any reality outside them, or have they some independent existence apart from their mental reality? Anyhow, there was an apparent contradiction between die universal character of our ideas and the individual character of concrete things. (...) The Scholastics solved this problem by drawing clear distinctions. An idea is an abstraction; as soon as it becomes applicable to a number of objects or things in the same sense, it is a universal idea. The "direct universal" (universale directum seu metaphysicum) as such has no existence apart from our minds, because an existing thing is always bound up with concrete, determining, individualizing notes, and it is these very circumstances or accidents which are ignored by the mind as it strips the thing of its individual characteristics. When the mind reflects on this "direct universal," i.e., on the abstract essence of the thing, it sees that this is to be found in many more things and that it is identical in all those things, and in this way the "reflex or logical universal" is formed (universale reflexum seu logicum). This same essence or quiddity is not really different from the thing itself, but the mind makes abstraction of all accidents, and this foundation makes it possible to apply this idea in die same sense to all other beings of the same kind, whether they are actually existing or not. In other words the universal as a universal has only reality in the mind but it has a foundation or a ground in the thing itself. Newman was not so well acquainted with Scholasticism that he knew and mastered the solution of the problem. As a matter of fact he approached it from quite another angle. Hence when scholastically trained minds read some of his statements on universals, they may feel shocked. They sound very curious, they seem incon418 DR. ZENO, O.F.M. CAP.419 sistent with each other, they apparenüy imply a negation of the objective reality of universals. This makes it necessary to compare the texts and to explain his meaning. a. Newman Inconsistent. We should never lose sight of the fact that Newman had no intention at all to enter the province of philosophy in the restricted sense of the word. "I am only contemplating the mind as it moves in fact, by whatever hidden mechanism,"1 that is what could be put as a heading to every page of the Grammar of Assent. And when he virtually deals with metaphysics, he wants us to consider his statements as hypotheses, or as propositions stated only by the way, and in this department he always wishes "to speak under correction." This explains how he could refer to the universale metaphy sicum and the universale directum in a very correct way without realizing he was teaching Scholastic doctrine. As far as I know, it is Professor Walgrave who has first drawn attention to this fact,2 when he dealt with Newman's alleged conceptualism. Newman states that "even one act of cruelty, ingratitude, generosity or justice reveals to us at once intensive the immutable distinction between those qualities and their contraries; that is, in that particular instance and pro bac vice."3 The same holds for the opposites: right and wrong, true and false, just and unjust, beautiful and deformed.4 In one experience, therefore, he sees a thing as an immutable, absolute quiddity, which objectively and in the same sense belongs to all possible things of the same kind, although the mind does not yet explicidy confirm this universal applicability. The contemplated quality remains limited to the particular case; but in its absoluteness it is stripped of all individual, changeable and concrete characteristics. This is the metaphysical universal of the Scholastics. But Newman also mentions the logical universal when he says: "As we form our notion of whiteness from the actual sight of snow, a lily or a cloud, so, after experiencing the sentiment of approbation which arises in us on the sight of certain... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NEWMAN'S PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCOVERY: THE ILLATIVE SENSE (Continued) VI THE FACULTIES OF COGNITION AND APPETITION Since the Grammar of Assent gives us a phenorhenological analysis of the art of thinking and often refers to the influence of other faculties in our reasoning processes, it will be very instructive to examine what the author holds about our faculties of cognition and appetition. This will make us better acquainted with the nature (...) of the illative sense. I. THE SENSES 1. The External Senses and their Objects. We had already arrived at the conclusion that Newman rejects the mere subjectivity of our knowledge. When he writes about this matter he explicitly deals with sensation or sensuous cognition. Although he takes exception to the word "immediate perception," 1 we may nevertheless call him an adherent of direct or immediate realism according to Scholastic terminology, because he emphatically excludes the intervention of a reasoning process from sense perception and uses the term "mediate perception" only to express the instrumentality of experience. In this meaning our perception of external objects is mediate or indirect indeed.2 The fact is that as early as 1839 he wrote in his University Sermons: "Of the material we have direct knowledge through the senses"3 and in 1843: "The senses are direct, immediate, and ordinary informants, and act spontaneously without any will or effort on our part."4 On the importance of sense perception for our mental activities he writes in a series of hitherto unpublished notes, entitled Elements of Thought:6 "I grant or I assume that the soul would not think without some external stimulus; that if it were cut off from all communication from the external world, it would pass this life in a sort of torpor... But then, as soon as it is roused, it reflects upon itself, and thereby gains a number of ideas..." 1. See supra V, 14.2. Supra V, 14.3. P. 205. 4.P. 303 ; cf. Gramm., p. 260. 5.See the unpublished Philosophical Papers, note Fcbr. 24, 1859. 40 DR. ZENO, OJM. CAP.41 Apart from the passages already referred to, Newman nowhere enlarges on the doctrine about the senses. He does not speak about the distinctions between sensible objects; he does not explain the difference between sensation and perception, and uses those terms promiscuously.6 There are no statements on the subject which contradict current Scholastic notions, although sometimes his vague terminology may be an occasion for misunderstandings. For instance, some passages in connection with "images" and "impressions," when read apart from the context, would appear to imply that he identifies them with the Scholastic species a sensibili accepta. However, we shall show further on that. Newman means something quite different. He deals with these species and the so-called sensibilia per acci· dens by the way when describing our knowledge of God7 and teaching that we have evidence of the presence of individuals or substances in the phenomena which occur to our senses. We picture those things to ourselves in those phenomena. They are like pictures, he says, but at the same time "they give us no exact measure or character of the unknown things beyond them." "Therefore when we speak of our having a picture of the things which are perceived through the senses, we mean a certain representation, true as far as it goes, but not adequate." 2. The Internal Senses and their Objects. Newman nowhere gives a distinction between external and internal senses, but nevertheless he speaks about those faculties of the mind which by the Scholastics are called the internal senses. These philosophers distinguish a common sense or rather a central sense (sensus communis), which unites the impressions of the external senses into one whole, makes us conscious of the conditions of our body and notifies to us the sensations of our external as well as internal senses; — the imagination or the faculty which preserves and reproduces things perceived; — the sensuous memory, i. e., the power to retain and to reproduce sense images; — and the vis aestimativa or the instinctive faculty, which discovers without any intellectual means, what is good and what is bad for our welfare. 6.It would seem that he generally... (shrink)

The point of the controversy is the interpretation of kant's article, "on a supposed right to lie from altruistic motives." my paper maintains: (1) that kant's interpreters, including w. schwarz, so far have failed to recognize the essential distinction kant makes between truth and truthfulness; (2) that apart from the historical context the disregard of this distinction has a demoralizing effect on man because it has penetrated and underlies all moral decisions as illustrated by two contemporary political situations.

According to the biopsychosocial model, developed by the late Dr. George Engel, how physicians approach patients and the problems they present is very much ...

In the past few years an increasing number of colleges and universities have added courses in biomedical ethics to their curricula. To some extent, these additions serve to satisfy student demands for "relevance. " But it is also true that such changes reflect a deepening desire on the part of the academic community to deal effectively with a host of problems which must be solved if we are to have a health-care delivery system which is efficient, humane, and just. To (...) a large degree, these problems are the unique result of both rapidly changing moral values and dramatic advances in biomedical technology. The past decade has witnessed sudden and conspicuous controversy over the morality and legality of new practices relating to abortion, therapy for the mentally ill, experimentation using human subjects, forms of genetic interven tion, suicide, and euthanasia. Malpractice suits abound and astronomical fees for malpractice insurance threaten the very possibility of medical and health-care practice. Without the backing of a clear moral consensus, the law is frequently forced into resolving these conflicts only to see the moral issues involved still hotly debated and the validity of existing law further questioned. In the case of abortion, for example, the laws have changed radically, and the widely pub licized recent conviction of Dr. Edelin in Boston has done little to foster a moral consensus or even render the exact status of the law beyond reasonable question. (shrink)

Christian Democracy, which may briefly be defined as organised political action by Catholic democrats, has been a major political force in Western Europe since the Second World War, not least in France. The aim of this book, first published in 1973, is to trace the Development of Christian Democracy in France from its origins in the 1830s to the present day, discussing its theories and its importance in French history and politics, with particular reference to the Fourth Republic when the (...) MRP was one of the key centre parties. Dr Irving provides a thorough analysis of MRP, its economic, foreign and colonial policies, and gives reasons for the relative decline of French Christian Democracy in the 1960s. This French movement has been little understood in Britain and a throrough history has been badly needed. This study will be valuable to all those who, in the context of a United Europe, wish to understand the political forces at work at its conception. It will be valuable especially to students of modern history and politics. (shrink)

Rationale: Deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the hippocampus is proposed for enhancement of memory impaired by injury or disease. Many pre-clinical DBS paradigms can be addressed in epilepsy patients undergoing intracranial monitoring for seizure localization, since they already have electrodes implanted in brain areas of interest. Even though epilepsy is usually not a memory disorder targeted by DBS, the studies can nevertheless model other memory-impacting disorders, such as Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). Methods: Human patients undergoing Phase II invasive monitoring for (...) intractable epilepsy were implanted with depth electrodes capable of recording neurophysiological signals. Subjects performed a delayed-match-to-sample (DMS) memory task while hippocampal ensembles from CA1 and CA3 cell layers were recorded to estimate a multi-input, multi-output (MIMO) model of CA3-to-CA1 neural encoding and a memory decoding model (MDM) to decode memory information from CA3 and CA1 neuronal signals. After model estimation, subjects again performed the DMS task while either MIMO-based or MDM-based patterned stimulation was delivered to CA1 electrode sites during the encoding phase of the DMS trials. Each subject was sorted (post hoc) by prior experience of repeated and/or mild-to-moderate brain injury (RMBI), TBI, or no history (control) and scored for percentage successful delayed recognition (DR) recall on stimulated vs. non-stimulated DMS trials. The subject’s medical history was unknown to the experimenters until after individual subject memory retention results were scored. Results: When examined compared to control subjects, both TBI and RMBI subjects showed increased memory retention in response to both MIMO and MDM-based hippocampal stimulation. Furthermore, effects of stimulation were also greater in subjects who were evaluated as having pre-existing mild-to-moderate memory impairment. Conclusion: These results show that hippocampal stimulation for memory facilitation was more beneficial for subjects who had previously suffered a brain injury (other than epilepsy), compared to control (epilepsy) subjects who had not suffered a brain injury. This study demonstrates that the epilepsy/intracranial recording model can be extended to test the ability of DBS to restore memory function in subjects who previously suffered a brain injury other than epilepsy, and support further investigation into the beneficial effect of DBS in TBI patients. (shrink)

Locally-developed measures represent great tools for institutions to use in assessing student outcomes. Such measures can be easy to administer, can be cost-effective, and can provide meaningful data for improving student learning. However, many institutions struggle with questions surrounding the quality of their locally-developed assessments. Are their instruments reliable? Are their instruments valid? Can the data generated from these instruments be trusted to drive change and improvement? The good news for faculty, staff, and assessment professionals is that there are steps (...) they can take to address these concerns and help to ensure the validity and reliability of their processes. This article describes the development and testing of a novel research instrument of students’ attitudes and abilities relating to critical thinking, metacognition, and intellectual humility. Using a $1,000 assessment grant from Sam Houston State University (SHSU), Dr. Glenn Sanford and Dr. David Wright devised the early drafts of the instruments, collaborated with colleagues, and joined with Mr. Jeff Roberts, Director of Assessment at SHSU, to develop and to test this new instrument. What follows is a description of the development of the resulting research instrument, results from the factor analysis and reliability testing of that instrument, and an overview of how those results have been used to make further instrument improvements. (shrink)

In a previous paper by Pollock and Singh, it was proven that the total entropy of de Sitter space-time is equal to zero in the spatially flat case K=0. This result derives from the fundamental property of classical thermodynamics that temperature and volume are not necessarily independent variables in curved space-time, and can be shown to hold for all three spatial curvatures K=0,±1. Here, we extend this approach to Schwarzschild space-time, by constructing a non-vacuum interior space with line element ds (...) 2=e2λ(r) dt 2−e−2λ(r) dr 2−r 2(dθ 2+sin2 θdϕ 2), where $\mathrm{e}^{2{\lambda }(r)}=-\frac{1}{2}(1-\frac{r^{2}}{R_{0}^{2}})$ , which matches onto the vacuum exterior Schwarzschild metric in such a way that e2λ and d(e2λ )/dr are both continuous at the Schwarzschild radius R 0=2M. Then we show that the volume entropy is equal to A/4, where $A\equiv 4\pi R_{0}^{2}$ is the area of the apparent horizon, as found by Hawking. (shrink)

Bhattacharyya, K. The Advaita concept of subjectivity.--Deutsch, E. Reflections on some aspects of the theory of rasa.--Nakamura, H. The dawn of modern thought in the East.--Organ, T. Causality, Indian and Greek.--Chatterjee, M. On types of classification.--Lacombe, O. Transcendental imagination.--Bahm, A. J. Standards for comparative philosophy.--Herring, H. Appearance, its significance and meaning in the history of philosophy.--Chang Chung-yuan. Pre-rational harmony in Heidegger's essential thinking and Chʼan thought.--Staal, J. F. Making sense of the Buddhist tetralemma.--Enomiya-Lassalle, H. M. The mysticism of Carl Albrecht (...) and Zen.--Parrinder, G. The nature of mysticism.--Cairns, G. E. Axiological contributions of East and West to the spiritual development of mankind.--Mayeda, S. Śaṇkara's view of ethics.--Mercier, A. On peace.--Barlingay, S. S. A discussion of some aspects of Gaudapāda's philosophy. (shrink)

Ongevraagde ouverture, door F. O. van Gennep.--Ethiek als waagstuk, door F. van Raalten.--Het juridisch aspect van de rabbijnse ethiek, door M. A. Beek.--Is er een eigen christelijke ethiek? Door H. J. Heering.--Het radicalisme in de ethiek, door F. O van Gennep.--Ethiek en praktijk van de geweldloosheid van Dr. Martin Luther King, door J. W. Schulte Nordholt.--Politiek pastoraat, door K. Strijd.--Mythe en ethiek, door F. van Raalten.--Veritas poetica, door C. W. Mönnich.--Ethiek in de counseling, door H. R. Wijngaarden.--Bibliografische gegevens uit het (...) werk van Prof. Dr. E. L. Smelik (p. 141-142). (shrink)

In the spring of 1987, I was in Havana, Cuba, where I was participating in planning a large-scale longitudinal study of the neurophysiological, neurochemical, and behavioral characteristics of cohorts of patients with cerebrovascular disease, depression, senile dementia, schizophrenia, or learning disabilities; and also part of this study were their first-degree blood relatives. This study was the outgrowth of a long-term project on the practical application of computer methods for the evaluation of brain electrical activity related to anatomical integrity, maturational development, (...) and sensory, perceptual;·-and cognitive processes, especially in chil dren. For many years, that project had been supported by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the National Scientific Research Center of Cuba (CNIC), and the Ministries of Public Health and of Education of Cuba. Since its inception, I had served as a technical advisor to the UNDP project. When the project began, I became acquainted with Dr. Jose M. Miyar Barrueco, who was at that time the Rector of the Medical School of the University of Havana. Because of his keen interest in the new computer technology and its potential utility in developing countries, we met from time to time during my visits. These occasional meetings continued after he became Secretary of the Cuban Council of State, so that he could remain apprised of progress and problems with which he might help. (shrink)

Synaesthesia is a condition in which one type of stimulation evokes the sensation of another, as when the hearing of a sound produces photisms, i.e. mental percepts of colours. R is a 20 year old colour blind subject who, in addition to the relatively common grapheme-colour synaesthesia, presents a rarely reported cross modal perception in which a variety of visual stimuli elicit aura-like percepts of colour. In R, photisms seem to be closely related to the affective valence of stimuli and (...) typically bring out a consistent pattern of emotional responses. The present case study suggests that colours might be an intrinsic category of the human brain. We developed an empirical methodology that allowed us to study the subject's otherwise inaccessible phenomenological experience. First, we found that R shows a Stroop effect elicited by photisms despite the fact that he does not show a regular Stroop with real colours. Secondly, by manipulating the colour context we confirmed that colours can alter R's emotional evaluation of the stimuli. Furthermore, we demonstrated that R's auras may actually lead to a partially inverted emotional spectrum where certain stimuli bring out emotional reactions opposite to the normal ones. These findings can only be accounted for by considering R's subjective colour experience or qualia. Therefore the present paper defends the view that qualia are a useful scientific concept that can be approached and studied by experimental methods. (shrink)